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Complex interconnected systems have high demands on meaningful analysis of the impact of failures on the actual
service provision. This includes the study of obvious and high probable events, but also failures that are difficult to
anticipate, e.g. due to cascading effects or combined events. This work introduces a framework for failure analysis
that enables the exhaustive identification of combined failures with the strongest impact on the functionality of a
system. The framework consists of two principal elements: a method for capturing the propagation of failures in
complex systems that are represented via function models, and algorithms for solving the identification problem,
which is formulated as combinatorial optimization problem. The feasibility of the approach is verified at hand of
a function model of an Offshore Wind Farm (OWF). Both algorithms are then applied to the model of an offshore
wind farm in order to identify the failure combinations with the strongest impact on the functionality.
Keywords: Reliability engineering, Function modelling, Failure propagation, Combinatorial optimization, Fault tree
analysis, Complex system, Combinatorial optimization.
1. Introduction
Failures are a common threat for complex systems
and should be considered in all phases of the
system life cycle. This includes the analysis of
known and expected failures, but also cascading
and multiple ones. Furthermore, related solutions
should be able to model systems in an appropriate
way and to assess in exhaustive manner the impact
of all possible failure combinations.
The reliability engineering community provides
a vast amount of powerful solutions for fail-
ure analysis in technical systems, with Function
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA) being the most representa-
tive examples Peeters et al. (2018). These clas-
sical methods, however, may fall short when it
comes to exhaustive analyses, as they are time-
consuming and often require a considerable man-
ual effort Kabir (2017). To circumvent this chal-
lenge, Rocco et al. Rocco et al. (2020) propose
the application of the formal analysis of concept,
which is a mathematical method for data analysis
that focuses on the relationship between sets of
objects and attributes. This method, though, is
rather restricted for exhaustive failure analysis of
complex interconnected systems. Sun et al. Sun
et al. (2019) propose the system theoretic formal
analysis method to identify interactive failures,
which only occur in case of two or more si-
multaneously failing components. The presented
approach uses a model checking tool for formal
analysis of the system that is described as state
machine. Thus, exhaustive analysis is possible.
However, this method is rather restricted for com-
plex systems. Ortmeier and Schellhorn Ortmeier
and Schellhorn (2007) discuss the use of formal
FTA for systems described as state charts. Despite
promising results, the authors conclude that the
most critical aspect is the actual formalization of
the FTA nodes.
The application of Model-Based System Engi-
neering (MBSE) is of gaining for complex system
development Cameron and Adsit (2020). MBSE
can be defined as formalized application of model-
ing to support the design, analysis and verification
of systems in a model-based context INCOSE
(2014); Kaiser et al. (2016). The early availabil-
ity of system models, often in form of model-
ing languages like SysML, motivated several re-
searchers to explore the applicability of formal
methods, e.g. for verification purposes Dickerson
et al. (2016). In case of failure analysis, though,
published works mainly focus on the automatic
generation of fault trees Dickerson et al. (2018) or
the combination with FTA Rambikur et al. (2017)
and FMEA Huang et al. (2017). The proposed
methods, though, appear less applicable for com-
plex systems and an exhaustive analysis of failure
propagation.
Analysis of cascading failures is a common
subject in the context of network-like systems.
These are commonly described as complex net-
works consisting of nodes that can share their
loads among each other Zio and Sansavini (2011);
Sicanica and Vujaklija (2020). Cascading failure
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analysis can be conducted based on the inher-
ent load distribution inside the grid using time-
discrete models. Despite their compelling appli-
cability for networks, these methods are less ap-
plicable for heterogeneous systems.
Kurtoglu et al. Kurtoglu et al. (2010) and van
Bossuyt et al. Van Bossuyt et al. (2019) apply
and extend the Function Failure Identification and
Propagation (FFIP), which reasons about critical
failure flows in systems. The presented solutions
employ a functional view on systems, quantify
individual risk of system elements and are able
to consider failure flows induced by multiple fail-
ures. However, the proposed methods are based on
discrete-time simulations, and thus, are less appli-
cable for exhaustive failure analysis if it comes to
complex systems.
To close this gap, this work introduces a frame-
work to exhaustively analyze all possible combi-
nations of failures and their impact on the func-
tionality of a system of interest. This is achieved
by extending function models by a system dy-
namic, deterministically describing the propaga-
tion of failing elements over time. Based on this
framework, we propose algorithms to identify the
failure combination with the worst possible out-
come considering each possible scenario.
This work is structured in four main sections:
Section 2 reviews the current state of the re-
spective fields, introduces related definitions and
concepts and motivates this work. The following
Section 3 introduces a method to describe the
propagation of failures in a system. Section 4 uses
this method to formulate a combinatorial opti-
mization problem that aims at the identification of
failure combination with the highest impact on the
system. Two algorithms are presented to solve that
problem, and both are discussed regarding their
complexity. Section 5 analyses the application of
the framework to the model of an offshore wind
farm. Finally, Section 6 concludes this work.
2. Preliminary
This Section introduces basic information and mo-
tivates this work.
2.1. Function models
Function Models (FM) are a common approach
for the graphical representation of complex sys-
tems. In FM, the elements of the system are rep-
resented by the functions they contribute to the
functioning of the system (cf. Beitz et al. (2007);
Hollnagel (2012); Yildirim et al. (2017)). These
functions can be physical devices, processes, or
conceptual functions, like the safety of work-
ers Erden and et al. (2008). The dependencies
between these elements are then represented by
arrows that connect the corresponding functions.
These arrows can mean flows of mass, energy or
information, or just dependencies, like the safety
of workers depending on a functioning firefight-
ing.
2.2. Failures and failure propagation
The notion of failure is defined in the European
standard on maintenance technology European
Committee for Standardization (2010) as:
Definition 2.1. The failure of an item is the event
of the “termination of the ability of an item to
perform a required function”.
To understand the propagation of failures within
complex system, the following distinction is im-
portant:
Definition 2.2.
(1) Primary failures have their root cause in the
respective item itself.
(2) Secondary failures are caused due to the fail-
ure of other items.
After a failure, the item is in faulty state until
recovery.
2.3. Fault tree analysis
There are a variety of methods to analyze the in-
teraction of primary and secondary failures, with
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) being one of the most
representative solutions Peeters et al. (2018). FTA
is a graphical deductive method for failure anal-
ysis that searches for possible explanations why
given failures, referred to as top event, could oc-
cur. Therefore, all events that possibly lead to top
event are arranged in a tree-like structure US Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission (1981). The leaves
of that tree are referred to as basic events and can
be considered the causes of the failure.
FTA is widely used for assessing probabili-
ties to a given event, e.g. Distefano and Puliafito
(2009); Halme and Aikala (2012), by computing
the set of (minimal) cut sets to the top event of
interest. These can be defined as follows Rausand
(2014):
Definition 2.3. A cut set (CS) is a set of basic
events whose occurrences ensure the top event to
occur. A minimal cut set (MCS) is a cut set, from
which no event can be removed such that it still
ensures the top event to occur.
By attributing probabilities to each MCS, one can
calculate the overall probability of the top event to
occur.
2.4. Origin of the approach
While most methods of failure analysis focus on
the most likely failures, or only on the failure of
specific elements, we aim to identify the scenario
with the biggest overall impact. This requires (1)
a model that is able to describe the system in
appropriate manner, including the propagation of
failures, and (2) an algorithm for analysis of all
possible failure scenarios.
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The first requirement is satisfied by the applica-
tion of function models (FM) that are extended by
a system dynamic that describes in deterministic
manner the propagation of failing elements over
time. The following Section 3 details this method.
As it regards the second requirement, a formal
representation of the problem and related algo-
rithms are employed. This is discussed in detail
in Section 4.
3. Failure propagation modeling
As described above, a system dynamic for mod-
eling the propagation of failures is required. This
dynamic shall map a given set of primary failures
to the resulting secondary failures, so that the state
of the system can be determined over a time period
of interest.
Let us therefore consider a system, represented
by a FM in the form of a directed graph G =
G(V,E), where the vertices V and edges E rep-
resent the functions and their interdependencies,
respectively. Each vertex can be in one of two
states, namely functioning or faulty. To model
the behavior of the system over time, consider a
discrete time period T = [0, tend] ⊂ Z. The state
of the system at a given time t ∈ T can then be
described by the following sets:
Let x(t) ⊆ V be the set of vertices corre-
sponding to functions suffering a primary failure
at time t, due to reasons outside the boundaries
of the model. Let x = ((x(0), x(1), ..., x(tend))
be the sequence of sets of primary failures. Let
y(t) ⊆ V be the set of vertices in faulty state at
time t, due to either primary or secondary failures.
Let y = ((y(0), y(1), ..., y(tend)) be the sequence
of sets faulty elements.
To model the occurrence of secondary failures
in the system, let us introduce the concept of
breakers:
Definition 3.1. For a given vertex v, let a breaker
b ⊆ V be a set of parent vertices of v, such that
v turns to faulty state in the next time step if all
vertices in b are faulty:
b ⊆ y(t)⇒ v ∈ y(t+ 1) (1)
v then is a target of b.
Let B(v) = {b ⊆ V | b targets v} be the set
of all breakers of v. B(v) has to be defined be-
forehand for each vertex along with the function
model, to specify how the functions depend on
each other. At a given time t ∈ T , a vertex v can
then be in faulty state for one of three different
reasons:
(1) It was in faulty state already: v ∈ y(t− 1)
(2) It suffers a primary failure: v ∈ x(t)
(3) It suffers a secondary failure. That means, all
the elements of at least one of its breakers
have to be faulty at time (t− 1): ∃b ∈ B(v) :
b ⊆ y(t− 1)
The system dynamic M, mapping x to y, then
reads as follows:
y(0) = x(0) (2a)
∀v ∈ V , t ∈ T, t > 0 :
v ∈ y(t) ⇐⇒
{
v ∈ y(t− 1)
v ∈ x(t)
∃b ∈ B(v) : b ⊆ y(t− 1)
(2b)
Given a sequence of primary failures, the sec-
ondary failures and can now be computed itera-
tively for all time steps.
Definition 3.2. Let us call the pair ε := (x, y) a
failure-sequence.
An exemplary FM, serving as example through-
out this work, is depicted in Figure 1, along with
the corresponding breakers.
Fig. 1. Exemplary function model. The numbers rep-
resent the functions of the respective system. The sets
below these functions represent their breakers. The
edges represent the dependencies between the func-
tions.
4. Optimizing the impact of failures
With the model defined, we are now interested in
finding the worst-case-scenario, namely the com-
bination of primary failures leading to the biggest
impact on the system. We define the notion ’big’
as the number of faulty vertices, weighted with a
cost function c(v) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V to represent their









y(t) denotes the set of all af-
fected vertices in the failure sequence ε.
4.1. Problem formulation
Note that as items remain faulty once they suffered
a failure, it makes no difference at what time




x(t), it is sufficient to identify which
items may suffer primary failures, without pay-
ing attention to the timing. For simplicity, let us
therefore call the pair E := (X,Y ) the failure-set
corresponding to ε, andMS the operator mapping
X to Y .
To control the kind of resulting failure sets, and
to exclude trivial cases such as X = V , where
all elements just suffer primary failures, obviously
leading to the biggest possible impact, it makes
sense to take into account the overall likelihood of
the failure sequences. If the primary failures are
considered to happen independently, the probabil-
ity of a failure sequence to occur is given by the
product of the probabilities of the primary failures





By limiting the probability of the failure se-
quences to consider by a limit probability p0 ≤
p(E), the analyst can define in what types of fail-
ure sequences (in terms of likelihood) he is in-







s.t. y =MS(X), (5b)∏
v∈X
p(v) ≥ p0. (5c)
4.2. Naive approach
Problem (5) is a combinatorial optimization prob-
lem (COP), as its input only allows distinct com-
binations from the set of vertices V . Solving such
problems can be achieved by enumerating all po-
tential solutions U , identifying the feasible ones
L and evaluating their objective function. In this
case, all possible combinations of primary failures
can be considered potential solutions, and those
satisfying Constraint (5c) can be considered the
feasible ones (with P the powerset):
U = {E = (X,Y ) |X ∈ P(V ), Y =MS(X)}
(6)
L = {E ∈ U | p(E) ≥ p0} (7)
Enumerating the potential solutions is com-
monly achieved by recursively arranging them in
the form of a tree. In this case, a natural way to
built such a search tree is to order the functions
and to successively add them to the already gener-
ated solutions. As p(v) ∈ [0, 1], p(E) then only
decreases along the branches of the tree. Once
the probability of a scenario falls below p0, there
can not be any further feasible solutions on that
branch, and the entire branch can be pruned.
The naive search tree corresponding to the FM
of Figure 1 is depicted in Figure 2, with the proba-
bilities set such that any feasible solution consists
of two primary failures at most.
Fig. 2. Naive search tree to the FM of Fig. 1. Each box
represents a potential solution, identified by its primary
failures. Red solutions exceed the limit probability and
the branch is therefore pruned.
4.3. Dual Function Graph
Depending on the size of the system and the limit
probability, the naive search tree may grow ex-
tremely fast, eventually exceeding available calcu-
lation power. A suitable way to reduce the number
of feasible solutions to test is therefore desirable.
For that purpose, two observations are of interest:
(1) Primary failures have no further impact if they
do not group up to breakers.
(2) Failing breakers may have an even bigger im-
pact if they interact.
By assuming that the worst case scenario only
consists of interacting breakers, any combination
of failures with no common effect can be dis-
carded from the set of potential solutions. This
makes even more sense, if we consider the analyst
to be well-aware of ’small’, local failures without
further effect. In that case, the analyst is indeed
rather interested in those combinations of failures
with non-trivial outcome.
It is therefore useful to investigate the inter-
actions between the breakers. A breaker b1 can
interact with another breaker b2 in two different
ways:
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(1) b1 and b2 share elements: b1 ∩ b2 = ∅
(2) b1 targets elements of b2: ∃v ∈ b2 : b1 ∈
B(v) ⇐⇒ target(b1) ∩ b2 = ∅
These interactions can be represented in an-
other directed graph, whose vertices represent the
breakers of the system, and whose edges represent
their interactions. Let us call this graph GD :=
(VD, ED) the Dual Function Graph (DFG), and





ED := {(bi, bj) | bi ∩ bj = ∅ ∨ target(bi) ∩ bj = ∅}
= {(bi, bj) | (bi ∪ target(bi)) ∩ bj = ∅}
(9)
The DFG to the FM of Figure 1 is depicted in
Figure 3.
Fig. 3. DFG to the FM of Fig. 1. The vertices of
the graph represent the breakers of the system, and
the edges represent their interactions. The targets are
represented next to each breaker.
Based on the DFG, a different search tree, only
containing interacting failures, can be built in the
following way: Starting from a given breaker, only
neighboring (and therefore interacting) breakers
are added in each recursion step. For the resulting
set of breakers B, the primary failures of the cor-
responding failure set can be computed by taking




(b ∪ target(b)) (10)




The resulting search tree corresponding to the FM
of Figure 1 is depicted in Figure 4.
Due to the implicit computation of the primary
failures, adding a parent breaker to a set of break-
ers however may replace primary failures and
therefore increase the probability of the solution
to occur. To ensure that this probability continues
to only decrease along the branches of the tree, the
Fig. 4. DFG search tree to the FM of Fig. 1. Each
box represents a potential solution, identified by the
breakers it consists of. Red solutions exceed the limit
probability and the branch is therefore pruned.
set of breakers to add has to be reduced to the set
of child breakers of the solution. To nevertheless
take into account parent breakers we make use
of the concept of MCSs from FTA: Each feasible
solution generated is a cut set to the breakers it
contains. By storing the minimal ones coupled
to the respective breakers, they can be taken into
account whenever that breaker is added to a solu-
tion. This procedure is described as pseudo code
in Algorithm 1.




2 Def ADDBREAKER(EB , Bnew):
3 Bc = GD.children(Bnew) \B
4 combs = GENCOMBINATIONS(Bc)
5 for comb ∈ combs do
6 E ′B =FAILURESET(B ∪ comb)
7 if p(E ′B) ≥ p0 then
8 save E ′B
9 ADDMCS(E ′B)
10 B′new = B
′ \B





16 for b ∈ VD do
17 EB =FAILURESET(b)
18 ADDBREAKER(EB , {b})
19 end
Starting from every breaker once, the function
ADDBREAKERS takes the children of that breaker
(line 3) and generates all possible combinations of
these, including their MCSs (line 4). Each result-
ing combination is added to the current failure set
(line 6) and checked for compliance with the limit
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Fig. 5. Function model regarding safety and security in an OWF (adapted from Ramirez Agudelo et al. (2020))
probability (line 7). If it complies, the solution is
stored to the set of feasible solutions, and also
added to the set of MCSs of every breaker in B′
to which it is minimal. Then, the next recursion
step starts. Note that ADDBREAKERS takes the
additional parameter Bnew, which represents the
breakers added in the last step. Only their child
breakers are of interest, as the children of the re-
maining breakers were already taken into account
in the previous steps.
With all the feasible solutions generated, their
costs can now be computed following Eq. (3) to
identify the optimal one. Here, further methods
from combinatorial optimization, like greedy or
branch-and-bound-algorithms, can be used.
4.4. Comparison of the algorithms
Given a uniform FM, where each element has
the same probability of failure pv , the maximal






Consequently, the number of feasible solu-
tions, and thus the number of scenarios to test
in the naive approach is of magnitude O (Nk).
The DFG-approach, on the other hand, depends
on the total amount of breakers |VD|. After the
first iteration step, however, only combinations
of child breakers are considered (together with
their MCSs), leaving P(δD) = 2δD|MCS| fur-
ther possibilities, with δD the number of edges
of a breaker in the DFG and |MCS| its num-
ber of MCSs. Assuming that only one further
primary failure is added to the scenario in each
iteration step, it takes up to k steps to reach







= O (|VD| 2k δD|MCS|).
Consequently, while the complexity of the naive
approach grows exponentially with the size of
the FM, the DFG-approach only grows lineally.
Instead of the overall system size, the decisive
parameter here is rather the inter-connectivity of
the breakers in the DFG.
Also recall that the results of the algorithms
differ: While the naive approach combines all
functions and therefore generates the complete
set of feasible solutions, the DFG-algorithm only
generates those consisting of interacting breakers.
Consequently, the latter does not necessarily find
the optimal solution to Problem (5), if its failures
may occur independently. As discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3, it depends on the analyst if such solution
are of actual interest.
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(a) Resulting failure set from the naive algorithm, with primary failures of the functions AIS, Weather data and Access
control
(b) Resulting failure set from the DFG algorithm, with primary failures of the functions EPIRB,AIS and
Weather data
Fig. 6. Resulting failure sets in the OWF model. While the solution generated by the naive algorithm leads to
higher costs, it consists of two distinct set of failures, which can occur independently.
5. Application
For comparison, both approaches are applied to
the FM of an offshore platform. In Köpke et al.
(2019), the authors propose a FM to represent the
assurance of safety, security and resilience (SSR)
of an Offshore Wind Farm (OWF), depicted in
Figure 5. The functions represented in the model
are classified in three different types:
(1) SSR-goals are the purposes of the system, rep-
resenting the different safety-related parts of
the OWF whose functioning are to guarantee.
(2) SSR-measures are the measures put in place
to achieve these SSR-goals.
(3) Sensors generate data necessary to operate the
SSR-measures.
5.1. Extending the FM
The additional attributes breakers, probability of
primary failure and costs of failure have to be
defined for each element to generate failure sets
from this FM. The breakers are set such that any
combination of two parent functions is a breaker
to the respective function (for functions with only
one parent function, this one is the only breaker).
Due to its high importance for navigation in the
maritime domain, the function AIS is excluded
from this rule, and set to be a breaker on its own to
the function Collision avoidance. Proba-
bilities and costs of failures are attributed based
on the functions type, as specified in Table 1.
Table 1. Attributes of the OWF model.
probability of costs of
type primary failure failure
SSR goal 0 100
SSR measure 0.01 10
sensor 0.1 1
5.2. Results
With a limit probability set to p0 = 10
−3, the
resulting failure sequences leading to the highest
costs, computed with the respective approaches,
are depicted in Figure 6.
The resulting failure sets differ: The naive ap-
proach indicates that the primary failure of the
functions AIS, Weather data and Access
control lead to the worst outcome, with five
SSR-goals suffering secondary failures and to-
tal costs of 563. However, this solution consists
of two distinct set of vertices, and is therefore
not generated by the DFG approach. The DFG
approach instead returns the primary failures of
Emergency Position-Indicating
Radio Beacon (EPRIB) instead of Access
control as single biggest failure sequence, set-
ting only five SSR-measuress faulty and leading
to total costs of 553.
While the first one is the actual solution to the
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COP as formulated in Eq. (5), it is not generated
by the DFG-algorithm, as it consists of two dis-
tinct failure sets, which can occur independently.
As discussed in Section 4.3, it depends on the
analyst if this solution is of actual interest.
6. Conclusion
This work introduced a new method for failure
analysis, focusing on the overall impact of failing
elements in a system. This is achieved by defining
a system dynamic for the propagation of failures
in function models. Based on this dynamic, the
problem of identifying the worst-case scenario
was formulated as a combinatorial optimization
problem. Two algorithms were proposed to solve
that problem: a naive one that generates each
possible solution, and the DFG-algorithm that
makes use of the dual function graph to reduce the
number of solutions to test. While their solutions
slightly differ, both algorithms can be of interest
depending on the use-case.
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